[INDONESIA-L] FEER - Wiranto Faces

From: apakabar@clark.net
Date: Fri May 29 1998 - 14:34:00 EDT


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From apakabar@clark.net Fri May 29 17:33:02 1998
Date: Fri, 29 May 1998 15:29:50 -0600 (MDT)
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Subject: [INDONESIA-L] FEER - Wiranto Faces Down One Threat, Others Loom
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98june_4/cover2.html
     
                               Soldiering On
                                        
            Military chief faces down one threat but others loom
     _________________________________________________________________
     
                         By John McBeth in Jakarta
     _________________________________________________________________
     
                                June 4, 1998
                                        
   O ne of the first casualties of the post-Suharto era was the former
   president's ambitious son-in-law, Lt.-Gen. Prabowo Subianto.
   Outflanked by his boss, armed-forces chief Gen. Wiranto, Prabowo was
   removed from his command of Indonesia's main combat force and assigned
   to head a staff college in Bandung.
     
   By all accounts, he took his demotion badly--at one point strapping on
   a sidearm, summoning several truckloads of troops and confronting
   guards at the presidential palace as he tried to win an audience with
   new President B.J. Habibie. He left empty-handed--but the incident may
   nevertheless have been the closest Indonesia came to its nightmare
   scenario: confrontation between military units with competing
   loyalties.
     
   It was a far from graceful comedown for the fiery 47-year-old, who
   partly on the strength of his Suharto connections had risen rapidly to
   become the army's youngest three-star general. At the same time, it
   was a victory for Wiranto, an astute political player who doubles as
   defence minister.
     
   He will need it: Complex challenges lie ahead for the armed forces,
   including the impact of political reform on dwifungsi, the concept
   that enshrines the military's role in political life. Another test may
   involve religious tolerance: Despite his success in heading off a
   dangerous rift, Wiranto was later forced into a damaging flip-flop in
   naming Prabowo's successor. His first choice, a Christian, was dropped
   amid signs that his selection had offended Muslim sensitivities.
     
   Ever since he became armed-forces chief in late February, Wiranto had
   sought to check the disrupting influence of Prabowo, who is known as
   much for his temper as for his soldiering skills. It was no easy task,
   given Prabowo's backdoor access to the palace and the way Suharto
   liked to play one officer against another to preserve his hold over
   the military.
     
   In the last hours of Suharto's presidency, however, Wiranto is
   believed to have won the ageing leader's approval to remove Prabowo as
   head of the Army Strategic Reserve, or Kostrad. Also sacked was
   Maj.-Gen. Muchdi Purwopranjono, who had stepped into Prabowo's old job
   as commander of the 6,500-strong Special Forces Regiment, Kopassus,
   when Prabowo was promoted to Kostrad two months ago.
     
   Prabowo appears to have learned what was afoot late on May 20, the
   night before Suharto resigned. In a foretaste of the palace incident,
   he, Muchdi and a strong security escort turned up at the home of Army
   Chief of Staff Gen. Subagio to enquire about a meeting Subagio had had
   with Suharto earlier that evening. "It was like a raid," says a
   prominent official who learned of the incident from a witness.
   "Subagio had guests and they were really frightened." The official
   says the younger generals left after talking to Subagio.
     
   Prabowo was formally relieved of his post the following morning. He
   then appealed directly to Suharto, who a short time earlier had read
   his resignation speech. According to insiders, Suharto admonished
   Prabowo for making trouble. Eldest daughter Siti Hardijanti Rukmana
   and other family members are said to have joined in the criticism.
   (Prabowo is married to Suharto's second daughter, Siti Hedijanti
   Herijadi.) Rebuffed, Prabowo later handed over his command directly to
   Subagio.
     
   However, this didn't stop him making repeated efforts to see President
   Habibie. The sources say Prabowo went later in the day to Habibie's
   house in the suburb of Kuningan and asked him to reverse the transfer
   order and reshuffle the military leadership.
     
   Prabowo clearly didn't get what he wanted. On the afternoon of May 22,
   he showed up at the presidential palace in full battle gear, armed
   with an automatic pistol and accompanied by "truckloads" of special
   forces troops, according to sources who were inside the palace. A
   tense verbal confrontation ensued with members of the Presidential
   Security Squad as Prabowo demanded to see Habibie. According to the
   source, Prabowo agreed to hand over his pistol in return for admission
   to the building. But he was later persuaded to leave--without seeing
   the president--by Maj.-Gen. Sintong Panjaitan, one of Habibie's
   military aides.
     
   The incident triggered an alert throughout the city. Kostrad troops
   hastily re-erected barbed-wire barricades at the approaches to the
   palace complex and armoured columns were redeployed in some areas.
   Habibie himself moved to the state guest house adjoining his
   presidential office, where he remained overnight, but there were no
   further incidents.
     
   During the weekend of May 23-24, Wiranto visited Prabowo at his home
   in Jalan Cendana, a stone's throw from Suharto's residence. What was
   said is not known, but family friends insist that Prabowo intends
   taking up his Bandung post. They also say he has denied involvement in
   the May 12 shooting of six students at Trisakti University and the
   kidnapping of pro-democracy activists--two cases in which the special
   forces have been mentioned as possible culprits. Prabowo couldn't be
   reached for comment.
     
   For Wiranto, however, the headaches weren't over. He initially
   appointed Maj.-Gen. Johny Lumintang, the highly regarded assistant for
   operations, to replace Prabowo. But only 18 hours later, Wiranto
   reversed himself, moving West Java regional commander Maj.-Gen.
   Djamari Chaniago into the position instead. Military spokesmen later
   portrayed Lumintang as merely a caretaker, but it appears Wiranto came
   under political pressure over the fact that Lumintang is a
   Christian--one of only a few among top officers.
     
   Wiranto apparently didn't want to fight that battle at this stage,
   despite his reputation for basing promotions solely on merit. Still,
   the decision could come with a cost. "Every Christian in the armed
   forces is going to see this as a personal affront," says a military
   observer.
     
   One of Wiranto's immediate tasks is also to sort out where the
   military stands on political reforms. Initially, the generals said
   changes should be "constitutional, conceptual and gradual." But that's
   hardly likely to satisfy civilian leaders now. Most are impatient for
   the introduction of new laws governing elections and political parties
   as a prelude to early parliamentary and possibly presidential polls.
     
   By taking a backseat role in Suharto's demise, the armed forces appear
   to have lost the initiative to proponents of a civil society, who see
   little room for military representation in the new parliamentary
   order. "I hope the military understands it will have to let go
   dwifungsi or otherwise reformation will be meaningless," says Mochtar
   Pabottingi, the architect of a political-reform blueprint now being
   studied by the House of Representatives. "I hope they realize the
   legitimacy they had is no longer there."